At the time
this article was written Gilles Paquet was Director of the Centre on Governance
at the University of Ottawa and author of numerous studies in economics and
public policy. This is a revised version of a speech to the Library of
Parliament Seminar series on February 2, 2001.
can be defined as effective co-ordination when power, information and resources
are widely distributed. Collaborative governance (rather than top-down
government) is required when citizens are faced with situations where no single
institution or stakeholder can lay claim to all the power, information and resources
necessary to resolve the problems confronting them. The new information and
communication technologies are a source both of disturbance in this
environment, and of new ways to foster collaboration in harnessing that
turbulence. This article looks at the problems and challenges of public policy
making in such a situation.
Governance, as defined above, is a subversive concept. It challenges not only
the view held by many in government circles around the world that government
has all the information, power, and resources to deal with any problem it
wishes to tackle, but also the presumption that it has the authority and
legitimacy to support such unilateral action.
On these matters, one may surmise that the
members of the present federal Cabinet are split in two camps: “les anciens” –
not the oldest members of the team necessarily – those who believe strongly in
such hegemonic views; and “les modernes” those who recognize that the federal government
is only one of the meaningful stakeholders in most situations, and that its
public policy making responses to the problems facing Canadians require
collaboration with partners from the private, public and civic sectors.
Tension necessarily ensues between the two
camps as those imbued with a centralizing mind set, and intent on imposing
their world view, (whatever the consequences) are confronted by those who see
the role of the federal government as one of a more modest sort: an animateur
in a game without a master, a broker capable at best of creative bricolage.
For the “modernes”, the governance of the
policy making process is of necessity collaborative. But collaboration is not
simple: it demands a sharing of power by the stakeholders who resist it; it
requires effective mobilization of the wit, imagination, and commitment of
partners, while at the same time avoiding the perils of partnership:
shirking of responsibility, abuse of power, etc. This in turn calls for
the development of effective social technologies of collaboration.1
The impact of new information and
communication technologies on this more diffuse public policy making process
has been both disruptive and enabling: they have created a great deal of
disturbance, but they can also be used to facilitate collaboration, and thereby
help to shape more efficient responses to these new circumstances.
The disturbance factor is ascribable to a
de-materialization and de-territorialization of the socio-economy generated by
the new technologies that have made it more footloose, and therefore more
volatile and less stable. The new technologies have freed individuals from the
constraints of matter and space, making possible a greater autonomy of
individuals and groups, and providing them with a much greater capacity to use
these degrees of freedom to weave alliances and partnerships across borders of
all sorts, or even to disengage altogether, to switch off. This new capacity to
switch on and off increases both the degree of relevant uncertainty and the
fragility of all national and territorial arrangements.
But these technologies also provide a means of
improving communication, of reducing the transaction costs among partners, of
fostering accelerated social learning, and of helping to make better use of
What remains unclear in this high-speed,
high-risk society is whether the new technologies (of which the Internet is the
most obvious) will tend to increase the complexity of the issues tackled by
public policy more rapidly and dramatically than they can help improve the
potency of the technologies of collaboration to help cope with these problems.
There are two schools of thought on these issues – the optimists and the
pessimists – but neither of these groups has succeeded in putting forward an
entirely persuasive argument in support of their elation or gloom.
Our core argument might be stated in
three propositions: First, the new information and communication technologies
are not a factor that can be analysed in isolation: one needs to consider their
impact in the context of the revolution in policy-making that is in progress –
a revolution that has affected both the form and content of public policy
making; Second, a certain cautious pessimism is in order in the short run,
because it appears that the new technologies are mainly used to sabotage public
policy processes, and have not been yet of much help in ensuring the new
required participation by all the relevant stakeholders in such processes; and
Third, a certain cautious optimism in the longer run may be warranted, however,
since the new technologies are likely to help the public policy makers to
operationalize more effectively and quickly the sort of participation that
would seem to be required in the new collaborative governance that underpins
the process of creative public policy making bricolage. This is what
The Old and the New Approach to Public
From the 1870s to the 1970s, the two
assumptions on which public policy making was built in Canada were the widely
held beliefs (1) that the public sector could do things better than the private
sector; and (2) that governments had an almost unlimited capacity to engineer a
redistribution of the benefits of sound policies throughout the population.3
So, when Canadians were faced with major challenges or crises, they turned to
governments – whether it be for constructing a railroad or putting a
broadcasting system in place. These government interventions obviously
generated winners and losers, but all unease about such potential inequities
was put to rest by the belief that government would subsequently interfere with
the redistribution of income and wealth so as to ensure that those who might
feel maligned would be generously compensated.
This was the glorious era of “government
knows best”, and of “the emergence of absolute social rights” bestowed on the
population by benevolent government diktats. Despite many failures in the
management of such interventions, until the 1980s, tolerant citizens allowed
governments to continue to claim technocratic omniscience as policy-makers, and
boundless benevolence as benefits equalizers.
In this old world of public policy making,
one did not sense any requirement for wide consultation. For instance, a case
study of the 1970s revamping of the Unemployment Insurance scheme would provide
ample evidence of the top-down way of crafting policy that was still in good
currency. It was a policy designed by a handful of people, under the leadership
of Guy Cousineau, sold to Cabinet by the good offices of Bryce Mackasey, and
pushed through the House of Commons as an enlightened way to fix the scheme in
the face of the challenges posed by the massive entry of the Baby Boomers in
The new public policy making operates quite
differently. First, it is characterised by the existence and persistence of
what are recognized as “wicked problems”. Governments have become ever more
ambitious in their endeavours, and as they have been confronted with increasingly
complex matters of policy, they have had to deal with thorny issues about which
(1) what was to be accomplished was not really clear and (2) one could not
count on stable relationships between means and ends.
One such wicked problem is the one confronting
Canadians in dealing with the issue of health care. The multiple objectives
pursued by health care systems are far from easy to synthesize. Moreover, the
delivery of such required policies depends not only on governments, but also,
and indeed primarily, on a multitude of partners in this socio-technical
system. Canadians are already spending a larger percentage of their GDP on
health than most countries in the world, and still Canadian morbidity and
mortality indexes are much worse in Canada than in countries that spend much
less of their income on health care. So it is clearly not simply a matter that
can be resolved by throwing more money at it.
A second characteristic of the new era in
policy making is that it is no longer possible for a few technocrats to design
and implement public policy in isolation. Citizens are now demanding to be
consulted; and most of the partners and stakeholders want to have a say in the
design of policy responses to issues that concern them.
So, policy issues cannot be encapsulated in
technocratic analyses. Interest groups have to be consulted; partners in
delivering a policy response have to be creatively engaged; political realities
have to be explicitly confronted. It is not sufficient to ensure that the
policy option is technically feasible. One must also make sure that it is
socially acceptable, practically implementable, and not too politically
destabilizing. Policy analysts of earlier times did not concern themselves as
much about these other dimensions because they considered themselves to be
mainly technocrats. They have now become truly brokers and animateurs.4
A third feature of the new era is the power
of political correctness and the prevalence of the language of rights.
Democracy is an ongoing, inclusive dialogue: no matter should ever be
beyond discussion, and no decision should be regarded as having been fixed
forever. But this sort of multilogue is now under threat. Political
correctness has created a family of taboo topics that have been all but taken off
the agenda; and the language of rights has generated a craving for definitive
answers of a yes-or-no variety in a world where more-or-less approaches are a
more effective way of handling the relevant issues.
What is required in the face of “wicked” problems is the sort of
experimentation with social technologies that is likely to lead to effective
coordination among the stakeholders, and to an accelerated social learning
about the ways to improved performance.
Are there limits to diversity? How much is
too much? Persons who insist on debating such issues are likely to be
called bigots, and the discussion they try to foster quickly dies out. In our
society of entitlements, the idea of a moral contract that outlines the
responsibilities of citizens, as well as their rights, is politically
incorrect: it is a taboo topic.
In the same spirit, the language of rights
has become a conversation stopper. It is sufficient to claim “this is my right”
to end the democratic multilogue. We are thus prevented from having debates
about matters that are important, difficult, and essentially contested – i.e.,
matters such that reasonable persons might come to honestly disagree about it.
One can see the deleterious effect of what is perceived as an absolute social
right in such a context. And indeed, the idea of an absolute social right to
health has been used most effectively as a conversation stopper: it has become
sufficient to say – “we do not want a two-tiered system, we do not want an
American-style system” to stop any critical thinking about reforms that would
appear to be required to repair our health care system, because such a
conversation might lead to some questioning of what has come to be regarded as
the absolute social right to health. This cripples the policy debates.
From Egalitarianism to Subsidiarity
Not only has the formal approach to
policy making changed, but the substance of policy making has also been
transformed. Egalitarianism used to serve as the lodestar for policy making in
Canada in the pre-1980 period. This is no longer the case. As a result, for
instance, there has been a significant move away from universality as a
mechanism and a guiding principle.
Instead of governments promising equality as
the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow, and therefore a world in which the
principle of universality would prevail, this has become the world of
clawbacks: while officials continue to pretend that public policy making is
designed to apply to all, they have found devices to ensure that benefits
really reach only those who need them most. For the others, governments provide
the benefit but claw it back at tax time. The result has been reduced coverage
for the unemployed, clawbacks of old age pension and child benefits. We have
moved from policies based on rights to policies based on needs.5
We have also seen the federal government
unloading of many of their former responsibilities onto the private or
civic sectors, or onto more junior levels of government, as it searched for
alternative and more efficient mechanisms for delivery of “public” services.
Program Review has introduced some Cartesian conceptual framework into these
efforts, and proposed a doctrine of subsidiarity as the new lodestar of policy
Subsidiarity posits that the individual
should take care of himself or herself. The state acts only as a reserve
army capable of coming to the rescue of the citizen but likely to do so only in
case of need. And if the citizen needs help, it is argued that this help should
first be sought in the family, or through private transactions or solidarity
relationships close to home. Only if these alternatives fail is help to be
provided by governments – first at the local level if it is at all possible
(because the needs may vary greatly from place to place). In this context,
policy help should be forthcoming from the federal government when and only
when it has been established that help cannot be provided efficiently at the
local or provincial level.
This shift from egalitarianism to subsidiarity
connotes not only a reduced role for government, but also a reduced interest in
broad redistribution. We have drifted very far from the grandiose plans
embedded in the Canadian equalisation payments scheme of the 1950s, which
aimed at nothing less than ensuring that everyone in the country would be
guaranteed the same level of public service, wherever they might live in
One might say that we are now focussed on
the more practical task of reducing somewhat the unacceptable inequalities –
whatever this may come to mean at different times.
Technology and Policy Making: Sabotage?
Now what will be the impact of the new
information and communication technologies, particularly the Internet, on this
emerging new world of policy making which is facing more difficult and wicked
problems, and must cope with the challenges of a move from
government-dominated to governance-flavoured policy making?
The new technology can obviously help a
citizenry that is more informed, or policy communities and interest groups that
are much more sophisticated in participating in public policy making. But
participation in public policy making can take two forms: taking part in the
problem definition, design, and implementation of the sort of modest bricolage
that policy making is capable of in a complex society nested in a globalized
context, or taking part in the process of opposing, stalling, and sabotaging
the policy that is in the making. Both “doers” and “stoppers” have an important
role in the policy making process. But, recently, the new technologies of
information and communication have been used much more extensively and
effectively by the stoppers than by the doers.
This is true not only at the local level
where the new technology of communication has permeated our local communities
to such an extent that a massive protest can probably be organized in no time
(City Hall being assailed by thousands of e-mails and other messages to which
the elected officials would have to pay attention); but also at the global
level, where this technology has been used very effectively to muster support
against some policy. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) was
not stopped by governments or opposition parties in legislatures (even though
it was a badly designed policy) but by private citizens and interest groups
that have found ways to be heard.
But “stopping” and sabotage are not
necessarily destructive activities. Stopping a bad policy in its tracks is a
good deed. It is part and parcel of participative public policy making. An
organisation like Greenpeace has had much “positive” influence in this manner
over environmental policy in industrialized countries. Yet sabotage is not
always constructive. The rename-Stockwell Day-Doris-Day phenomenon initiated
by This Hour has 22 Minutes during the last election campaign is a case
The Internet has given the stoppers the capacity to organise very
quickly, and the results of this organizational work were seen in Seattle, in
Washington, in Davos, and in Quebec City in April 2001.
This was not simple political satire: it had
the effect of stopping discussion of a legitimate tool of consultation — a
referendum. There is much room for disagreement about the usefulness of
referenda, and the conditions under which one should be used, but what was
accomplished, through this Internet-based campaign, was that the very idea of a
democratic referendum was “flamed” (as the hackers would say), and the debate
about it was stopped by a small group of clever persons using the new
It is fair to say that the new technologies
have not been used to the same extent and as effectively yet in the
“constructive” world of public policy. But as e-governance becomes more firmly entrenched,
and initiatives like Government on Line proceed beyond the fixation on the new
delivery mechanisms for existing services, powerful new instruments of
participation in policy making may be expected to emerge. But we are not there
Indeed, to the extent that there has been
any reflection on the role of Internet in policy making, it has been focussed
on efforts to immunize the policy process from the effective actions of the
The strategy on this front is inspired by
the efforts of information technology experts in their effort to avoid
information systems crashing in toto. As a strategy to avoid such outcome, they
engineer deliberately some forms of partitioning, balkanisation of the system
so that if one segment crashes under attack, the whole system is not affected.
In a word, it is a strategy of deliberate decentralisation. Such a strategy has
had the added benefit of muting the potential for redistribution.
When policy making is decentralised, it
becomes much more difficult for any organised group to successfully try to
derail the process. This explains why wide-based social movements like
the feminist or the ecologist movements (that are so decentralised) are also so
difficult to counter effectively. If there are five or ten sites of power, one
cannot easily stop decisions from being made.
But this decentralization approach (defendable
though it might be for many other good reasons) may not necessarily help in
making the highest and best uses of the informational economies of scale that
Internet promises or in designing policy participatively: to ensure broad-based
participation of all the stakeholders in the process of problem definition,
policy design, implementation and evaluation of policy initiatives.
Why is progress so slow in using the new
technologies of information and communication to ensure a robust form of
citizen participation, and why are legislatures almost everywhere so hostile to
such initiatives? This is easily understood when one realizes that stakeholders
participation and involvement is quite a reframing challenge in a
representative democracy where elected officials are supposedly empowered to
take decisions without continually referring them back to their constituents.
Here the world of governance is subversive in an even more fundamental way, for
the “governance work” the citizen has to do strikes at the foundations of
representative democracy.7 This explain why legislatures are very
cool to these new ideas and are likely to encourage pseudo-consultations where
officials pretend to listen to the citizenry but pay little attention to the
In our Westminster political system,
bureaucrats are seen as accountable upward to Parliament through their
minister. Yet in the world of governance, bureaucrats are not
simply accountable upward to the Minister, they are also accountable downward
(so to speak) to the citizens, and sideways to the partners and colleagues in
the private, public and civic sectors, with whom they have created networks and
alliances in order to be able to despatch their work. This shift from
“Westminster government” to “distributed governance” has transformed the
experience of even the Canadian armed forces – a most hierarchical form of
The armed forces have traditionally been
accountable to the Prime Minister. Yet since the Oka crisis, things have
changed. At that time, the situation appeared out of control, bridges
were booby-trapped by urban guerrillas, and there was a sense of anarchy in the
small zone surrounding the conflict area. All the officials — federal,
provincial, and local politicians and bureaucrats — were ducking for cover.
This is the time when General de Chastelain initiated the practice of
holding a press conference every evening at 7:00 o’clock to discuss the state
of play, and to answer questions about the situation. He began to report
to the citizenry directly.
Since then, many other issues involving the
military have ended up being debated and resolved in the wider court of public
opinion: the predicament of General Jean Boyle is a case in point. He left his
position of Chief of Defence Staff when it had become clear during public
hearings that he was unable to explain satisfactorily the mishaps at the
Department of National Defence except by blaming subordinates and claiming that
he had not been as fully informed as he should have. This was regarded by
Canadian citizens as unsatisfactory a response and unacceptable an explanation.
Some would say that General Boyle had failed to meet the expectations of the
citizenry with reference to his burden of office.9
But the accountability of the armed forces
has also been somewhat internationalised. For instance, General Romeo Dallaire
and many of the Canadian officers who have served under the United Nations
banner have seen their behaviour scrutinized, and their decisions questioned by
international courts, by investigative commissions in other countries, thus
broadening considerably the range of accountabilities for the Canadian armed
The new governance regime also raises serious questions about the
traditional notion of accountability. Indeed, this notion is completely
transformed when one drifts from “government” to “governance”.
Another meaningful event occurred when the
Canadian armed forces were invited to help in disaster relief on the occasion
of the 1998 ice storm that struck Quebec and Eastern Ontario. The Quebec
Government agreed to the presence of Canadian troops on Quebec soil for that
purpose, under strict conditions imposed by Premier Lucien Bouchard – that the
soldiers would not bear arms while on duty on Quebec territory. It revealed
that the Canadian armed forces were also accountable in some ways to provincial
Finally, one might add that with the Charter
of Rights of the 1980s, even the Canadian armed forces have had to take into
account a variety of decreed rights for citizens, and this dramatically changed
the way in which officers deal with soldiers.
Indeed, even an institution as strictly
hierarchically structured as the armed forces has developed a completely
transformed accountability structure – a 360 degree accountability.10
One might illustrate this transformation of
accountability in a variety of ways, but the so-called Human Resources
Development Canada scandal of recent vintage is another classic illustration of
this evolution. At the core of the difficulties experienced by the department
is the simple fact that many departmental officials did not understand that
they were also accountable to the citizenry, and should have been able to
explain the policy, and what use had been made of the funds under their
control, in a language understandable and acceptable to the citizenry. When it
became clear that the bureaucrats were not able to do so, hell broke loose.
The fault does not lie exclusively with the
bureaucrats when mishaps occur in this evolving world. Citizens also fail
sometime in fully grasping the meaning of these changes. For instance, an
important consequence of the dawn of 360-degree accountability that has not
been completely understood by the citizenry is that it entails of necessity a
softer notion of accountability than what has been in good currency for those
schooled by the reports of the Office of the Auditor General this 360-degree
accountability can only mean a much more diffuse accountability, and citizens
have often found it difficult to shed their old rigid notions of what an
adequate rendering of account means.11
Public policy making is drifting from a top
down authoritarian government regime to a distributed governance regime that is
more inclusive and participative, and characterized by 360-degree and softer
accountabilities. The social learning process underpinning the new regime is,
however, crippled by the complexity of the new issues being tackled, by the
need to engineer meaningful citizen participation, and by the difficulty in
getting the multilogue going because of political correctness and the fixation
on a language of rights.
The difficulty is heightened by the fact
that the underlying philosophy of egalitarianism of the Welfare State is
gradually being displaced by the subsidiarity philosophy of the Strategic
While the new technologies might serve in a
constructive way in the design of public policy, they have been mostly used in
a rather destructive way to stop policy processes that proved unacceptable to
well organized groups.
Finally, one of the main reasons why the new
technologies have not been as effective as they might have been in
permeating the public policy making process, is that the sort of robust
participation they enable runs against the grain of the representative
democratic system in good currency. Consequently, the use of the new
technologies has met much resistance in conservative circles (and these circles
are the dominant circles in the public policy making processes).
In the face of such difficulties, how can
policy makers react?
One possibility is the path of denial —
i.e., to refuse to admit that the problems are more “wicked” than before or
that governance (in the sense I have defined it) is now necessary. This is the
stance of the policy makers who have refused to believe that they have to
engage the citizen and develop a 360-degree and softer accountability
In the face of the citizens’ growing demands
for inclusion and participation in public policy making, this strategy of
denial can only lead into a trap known in French as “gouvernementalité”: i.e.,
government manipulation of information and public opinion as a way to subvert
these demands by the citizenry.
Canadians were exposed to this strategy
during the last election campaign when leading officials argued that
centralisation was the only guarantee if citizens wanted to preserve what
Canadians had come to refer to as their basic and absolute “social rights”.
The choice, according to the Chrétien doctrine was between a strong
central government or chaos. This enabled the Liberal Party to present itself
to Canadians as the guardian of the cherished redistributive schemes and to
avoid discussing critically the needed repairs to these schemes.
Another path is e-governance, i.e., the
decision to embrace an exploration of the use of the new technologies as means
of catalyzing the process of collective intelligence. This second approach is
based on the redefinition of the role of the state from its former core
redistributive function to a new dual core function based on
connecting/disconnecting – a sort of État commutateur – and facilitating
social learning – a sort of Strategic State. The central challenge for
the new state is to build bridges among partners. The state becomes a
facilitator of discussion in a public policy making that is no longer top down but
truly all inclusive.
Collective intelligence is at the core of
this new policy making regime in the new socio-economy, and public policy
making is geared to better use of collective intelligence and to accelerated
social learning. This entails a triple strategy of intervention: a strategy of
connexity to ensure that no one is excluded; a strategy of catalysis to ensure
that all the blockages to social learning are eliminated; and a strategy of complétude
to ensure the requisite action by the state through additional organizational
or institutional interventions when there are governance failures.
Which of these two paths will prevail?
Gouvernementalité or Strategic State? In the short run, one is bound to
be pessimistic. We seem to have little real capacity for collaboration
We still look at things in terms of competition and confrontation –
region versus region, federal government versus provincial government,
management versus labour. We are not committed to thinking about serious
joint solutions to real problems, even when new technologies would appear to
hold the promise of developing creative technologies of collaboration.
Does this mean that no progress can be
anticipated? No; the outlook is more promising in the longer run.
Canadians would appear live in a state of torpor, and many observers have
publicly denounced it. As a result, public policy making in Canada is more in
the nature of bricolage. It is not rooted in sweeping revolutionary
interventions, at least not since the Trudeau days, for the citizenry would not
react well. While this can lead to despair about ever righting the wrongs, some
benefits emanate from such torpor.
Anyone who has attended a soccer game in
Italy or certain other European countries will understand the merit of a
certain degree of tolerance and torpor. The band that accompanies the visiting
team must be kept in a cage, and away from the hometown fans, for fear of what
the home town fans might do to them.
Canadians are not such an emotional people.
They do not get excited easily. Their relative torpor may preclude
their hotly debating the disappearance of universality or the reforms necessary
for our health care system to thrive, but this does not mean that the world of
policy making is not evolving. Slowly, gradually, unnoticeably, adjustments are
made every day to our policies as a result of necessity. Without much debate
about visions, grandiose schemes, utopias, and chimeras being carried out in
the public forum, bricolage is at work. Ten years from now, a highly
transformed health system will be in place as a result of that silent tweaking,
even without grand debates. It might happen without Canadian citizens even
The new information and communication technologies
will obviously play a most important role in this process of silent tweaking.
After a stage where the fear of sabotage will have been the central
concern, one may expect that the new information and communication technologies
will transform public policy making slowly and in an evolutionary manner.
At first, the silent tweaking will deal
mostly with retooling – delivery systems for public goods without much being
change in the public policy process. Then, in the intermediate run, as the
technology of service delivery evolves, the structures too will have to evolve.
Consultation will become less a deceitful contraption and more truly an effort
to listen. In some circles, prospective leaders are already debating the ways
in which the parliamentary system might have to be modified to accommodate
these new expectations of the citizenry. But it is only later – in the longer
run – and perhaps even after the fact, that Canadians will become aware that
they have reframed completely their governance structures. This is the Canadian
Malcolm Ross put it very aptly almost half a
century ago when he suggested that Canadians are “the people of the second
thought”, that their central characteristic is prudence.12 This has
led Canadians to heed John Maynard Keynes’s advice to economists – avoid
dealing with big problems, emulate the dentists and deal with the small holes.13
Perhaps that is our Canadian destiny, and we
should embrace it rather than deny it, and be satisfied with modest public
policy making bricolage, even if it is Internet-based bricolage.
See G. Paquet, Governance Through Social Learning. Ottawa: The
University of Ottawa Press, 1999.
See G. Paquet, “E-gouvernance, gouvernementalité et État commutateur"
Relations Industrielles/ Industrial Relations, Vol. 55, No. 4, 2000, pp
Hardin, A Nation Unaware. Vancouver: J.J. Douglas, 1974.
See C. Taylor, “The ACIDD Test: A Framework for Policy Planning and Decision
Making” Optimum, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1997, pp 53-62.
Paquet, “Innovations in Governance in Canada” Optimum, Vol. 29, No. 2/3,
1999, pp 71-81.
Paquet, “Tectonic Changes in Canadian Governance” in L.A. Pal (ed) How Ottawa
Spends 1999-2000 – Shape Shifting: Canadian Governance Toward the 21st
Century. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 75-111.
Cardinal and C. Andrew (eds), La démocratie à l’épreuve de la gouvernance.
Ottawa: The University of Ottawa Press, 2001.
8. G. Paquet, “States, Communities and Markets: The Distributed
Governance Scenario” in T.J. Courchene (ed.) The Nation State in a Global
Information Era: Policy Challenges. The Bell Canada Papers on Economics and
Public Policy, 5. Kingston: John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic
Policy, 1997, pp. 25-46.
Paquet, “The Burden of Office, Ethics, and Connoisseurship” Canadian Public
Administration, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1997, pp. 55-71.
See G. Paquet, “Auditing in a Learning Environment: The Case of the Military” Optimum,
Vol. 29, No. 1, 1999, pp. 37-44.
L. Juillet, G. Paquet and F. Scala, “Gouvernance collaborative, imputabilités
douces et contrats moraux: un cadre d’analyse” Gouvernance, Vol. 2, No.
1-2, 2001, pp. 85-95.
M. Ross (ed), Our Sense of Identity. Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1954.
H.S. Gordon, “The Political Economy of Big Questions and Small Ones” Canadian
Public Policy Vol. 1, No. 1, 1975, pp. 97-106.