At the time this article was
written John Uhr was on the staff of the Senate of Australia. In 1986 lie was a
Harkness Fellow and Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institution in Washington
D.C.
One by-product of the celebrations
surrounding the bicentennial of the American Constitution is the rediscovery of
certain old and neglected works of political -theory. John Locke, for example
is one of the founders of modern constitutionalism. Some of the most powerful
principles underlying both American and British theories of government are
found in his thought.
Edmund Burke, in his famous Commons
speech moving resolutions for conciliation with the American colonies, revealed
the basic unity of political purpose between England and the United States. The
Americans, he said, are "not only devoted to liberty, but to liberty
according to English ideas and on English principles". The influential
source of English theory and American practice was John Locke.
Locke's ideas on legislative power
were seized upon more eagerly by the Americans than by the English who, like
Blackstone, greatly respected Locke but wondered whether he "perhaps
carries his theory too far". English defenders of parliamentary government
recoiled from the full logic of Locke's theory and domesticated it, fearful of
what a liberated legislature might mean for traditional parliamentary executives.
For Locke, the supreme political power is the legislative power. To understand
what this means, we owe it to ourselves to rediscover what Locke originally
intended for a healthy legislature, and to ponder why his English and American
followers drew different conclusions from his classic theory of modern
constitutionalism.
Locke's Second Treatise of
Government' defended the parliamentary cause in the English Revolution of 1688
and influenced the cause of self-government in the American Revolution of 1776.
His work is fundamental to the concept of limited government which operates on
the basis of popular consent to protect individual rights and liberties.
Although much of his writing did contribute to the case for an active
legislature, Locke was not an advocate of either parliamentary sovereignty or
legislative supremacy. His thought is useful precisely because it relates the
legislature to both popular sovereignty and executive power - like a ladder of
political ascent from the people through the legislature to the executive. As a
founder of limited or constitutional government, Locke understood much about
the nature of the legislature, including its limitations. His thought
encompasses both legislature and executive, and from him one can trace a source
for two arguments which, over time, have loosened themselves from the control
and unity of his original formulation. 1 refer to the cases for legislative
supremacy and executive privilege, each of which claims Locke as authority.
Government by Consent
As part of his battle against the
executive tyranny of the Stuart Kings, Locke fabricated the powerful image of a
social contract. This contrived picture serves as a standard for judging
political affairs. In Locke's hands, this idealised picture of the origin of
government reinforced the revolutionary doctrine of consent based,
representative government. In place of the traditional emphasis on the
discretionary prerogatives of the sovereign executive, the new teaching limited
government to securing those conditions as agreed upon in the social contract.
By the device of the social contract, Locke forced men to evaluate government
primarily in terms of its adherence to the consent of the governed -as
originally formulated in the social contract and continually represented and
kept alive in the legislature. Under the social contract each individual agrees
to the formation of a community under a government with responsibility
"for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in
a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any that
are not of it"(95). The civil community arises out of general consent, but
the institution and operation of government cannot afford the luxury of
decision-making by consensus: government by consent means government
established by majority rule.
The primary task of the social
contract is to specify the political institutions required by civil society. To
Locke, the key institution is the legislature because the legislative power is the
fundamental one. Locke is not a legislative supremacist; one cannot believe in
parliamentary supremacy and the social contract, for the latter is an
expression of popular, rather than parliamentary, sovereignty. In Locke's
scheme, the people are sovereign, and through the social contract they come
together to construct a limited government which can represent the community.
Should it fail repeatedly to represent their interests and degenerate into
tyranny, the people may withdraw their consent. The important question probes
the roles of the legislature and executive in maintaining popular consent. In
the event that the two powers were to clash, which is meant to predominate? And
who or what is meant to arbitrate in such an eventful clash?
Role of Legislature
The social contract can authorise
any form of government which, in the circumstances, will further the aim of
civil society i.e. to supply the law and order so absent from the pre-social
state of nature, Absolute monarchy, where legislative and executive power rest
in the same person, is unacceptable. Civil peace and popular security
necessarily require a separate legislature, an institution in which the
fundamental legislative power is "placed in collective Bodies of Men, call
them Senate, Parliament, or what you please" (94). The precise form of the
legislature will change with the agreed form of government, but its task is
always to provide for the rule of law: "to govern by established standing
laws, promulgated and known to the People, and not by Extemporary decrees"
(131).
The form of government depends upon
who holds "the Supreme Power, which is the Legislative." Legitimate
forms may vary, but "the first and fundamental positive Law of all
Commonwealths, is the establishing of the Legislative Power." The
legislative is "the supreme power . . . sacred and unalterable in the
hands where the Community have once placed it." The legislative power is
supreme by virtue of its right "to make laws for all the parts and for
every member of the society". Thus all other political powers are
"derived from and subordinate to it" (132,134,150). The executive
power is "visibly subordinate and accountable to it, and may be at
pleasure changed and displaced."
Locke excuses the monarch from this
chain of accountability, as in English limited monarchy that person has an
active 'share in the legislative", in the sense that he constitutes a
distinct component of the legislature, proposed laws requiring his assent. But
of "other ministerial and subordinate powers", Locke is emphatic that
"they have no manner of authority any of them, beyond what is, by positive
Grant, and Commission, delegated to them . . .". The legislature's
supremacy extends to the power to resume executive power from ministers
"when they find cause, and to punish for mal-administration against the
Laws." Thus, "the Executive being both ministerial and subordinate to
the Legislative" is far from a co-equal partner in government (152, 153).
Or so it seems, at least in times free from national emergency.
Legislative Limitations
The legislative power is the
fundamental power of government, but this does not mean that the holders of
this power enjoy unhampered political mastery. By "supreme", Locke
means crucial or pivotal: depending on how this power is exercised, the whole
scheme swing from free to despotic government. Locke envisages the possibility
of an elected representative assembly, operating on majority rule yet subject
to a set of constitutional reservations derived from the social contract.
The legislature is not omnipotent:
it is constrained by its character as "a Fiduciary Power to act for
certain ends." The sovereign people may "remove or alter the
Legislative, when they
find the legislative act contrary
to the trust reposed in them" (149). Locke explicitly specifies the
limitations on legislative power. Among them are that the legislature shall
rule only by "declared and received Laws, and not by extemporary dictates
and undetermined Resolutions". The law must not confer on appointed
officials unfettered discretion that require individuals "to obey at
pleasure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of [officials'] sudden thoughts,
or unrestrained, and till that moment unknown wills without having any measures
set down which may guide and justify their actions" (137). In addition,
the legislature shall not delegate its power to others, for the people have
themselves delegated their power to it as "being only to make Laws, and
not to make Legislators" (141).
Executive Prerogatives
Locke sees an additional political
challenge to the legislature from the executive. The separation of executive
from legislative power is designed to bolster the impartial rule of law: the
executive should concentrate on the formal execution of legislative will, and
the legislature should not be tempted into selective enforcement of its laws.
The legislature, with a watchful eye over its shoulder to the people, can then
act as a check and balance on the diligence of the executive.
However, some element of executive
discretion is unavoidable. First, the written law cannot foresee or provide
guidance for all circumstances; and second, the law may have to be modified on
account: of the harms and defects of "an inflexible rigour" or
"a strict and rigid observation" especially during times of national
emergency. As Locke puts it: "This power to act according to discretion,
for the public good, without the prescription of the Law, and sometimes against
it, is that which is called Prerogative". The traditional suspicion of the
prerogative rule of "Kingly Government" is valid, in that history is
full of awful examples of resort to "an Arbitrary Power to do things
hurtful to the people" (159, 160, 163). But instead of denying the place
of executive prerogative, Locke denies the name to the historical examples. A
self-governing people would be right, in Locke's view, to confer prerogative
power on their executive - conditional on its just exercise, as determined in
the first instance by the legislature and ultimately by the people.
Can this be the same Locke, famous
in the development of modern constitutionalism for the precept that
"Where-ever Law ends Tyranny begins"? Does not this conditional grant
open the door to selective civil disobedience, as individuals and groups play
the executive off against the legislature, reducing majority rule to 'Anarchy
and Confusion" (202, 203)? Locke's answer implies that there is an equal
danger that the legislature will betray its trust to the people, so that a
people must be taught to be equally jealous of both powers. In general Locke
sees the gravest danger in popular toleration of misgovernment, whether by
executive or legislature. His task is to arouse the people to greater
vigilance, which might well be a calculated effect of his open praise for the
necessity of executive prerogative. To his critics who are fearful of new waves
of popular sedition, Locke argues that his doctrine of people power is actually
"the best fence against rebellion" in. that it reminds both rulers
and legislators of their proper place (2.26-7). Greater crimes have come from
zealous rulers than from rebellious citizens.
The Three Supremes
It is one thing to confuse the
supremacy of legislative power with supremacy of the legislative institution.
But Locke forces us to think much harder by referring to three supreme powers.
We have learned something of the supremacy of the legislative power, but Locke
also says that the executive 1n a very tolerable sense may also be called
supreme" (151); and elsewhere that the community 'perpetually retains a
supreme power" against foolish or wicked rulers (149). Proponents of
greater parliamentary power neglect or ignore Locke's emphasis on executive
prerogative. Defenders of prerogative stray far from the rebellious borders
Locke erected to fence in its unsound use. Both sides underestimate the logic
of popular sovereignty and tend to treat popular trust as an entitlement to,
rather than a condition of, political power.
The most dramatic illustration of
Locke's doctrine of popular sovereignty is the 1776 Declaration of Independence
by the United States. It states that governments exists to secure "certain
unalienable rights ... among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness." Governments derive 'their just powers from the consent of the
governed" and, most striking of all" . . . whenever any form of
government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to
alter or abolish it . . .".
The ultimate power is that of the
people. It is they who through the social contract authorise the form of
government. It is they who delegate their natural legislative power to the
legislature, which enjoys supreme political power so long as the form of
government is faithful to its original purposes. During times of good government,
supreme power is vested in the legislature and remains latent in the people.
Paradoxical as it may sound, the people have no right to civil disobedience -
or to selective adherence to the will of the legislature - but they do have the
right to dissolve government and to revise the social contract whenever the
form of government, and not merely its occasional exercise, becomes destructive
of their liberties. They have an ultimate right to resist tyranny but not an
everyday right to disobey law.
If the sovereign people may not
disobey the law, by what right may the executive resort to prerogative in
defiance of the legislature? Locke's answer is loud but unclear: indeed, his
very insistence on executive prerogative alarmed the framers of the American Constitution,
who made every effort to confine the exercise of executive power within written
constitutional channels. At the same time, the framers shifted much of the
political burden from the people to the legislature. They were suspicious of
popular judgement and feared for the rights of minorities under the tyranny of
majority opinion. The relationship between the
Declaration and the Constitution
illustrates the relationship between the legitimating consent of the original
social contract and the operational consent as provided for in constitutional
majorities. The right of revolution is a power the people have in extreme
circumstances to withdraw their legitimating consent and to dissolve
government. Following Montesquieu's adaptation of Locke, the American framers
devised constitutional procedures capable of taming and harnessing executive,
legislative and popular power. Neither for Locke nor for the framers did
popular sovereignty mean daily rule by simple majorities. Locke was prepared to
tolerate a wide range of legitimate forms of government, each of which would
have to establish its own balance between executive and legislative powers. In
this he is much more daring and open than the American framers who, for the
most prudent of reasons, tended to focus on practical institutions rather than
theoretical powers.
The history of modern
constitutionalism has been one of experiments in balancing these three
supremes. The black letters of constitutional law have generally bolstered the
legislature's rights against executive privilege, but executives have
discovered plenty of harbours of "exceptional circumstances" to which
they can retreat in secrecy and safety. The balance between executive and
legislature will continue to oscillate, although the bias in representative
governments must favour the legislature, which "is the soul that gives
Form, Life, and Unity to the Commonwealth" (212). The measure of Locke's
achievement is that his treatment of executive - legislative relations laid
bare the political foundations which subsequent theorists tended to cover over
and obscure with a legal superstructure. However grateful we might be for that
constitutionalizing apparatus, we should always return to Locke for lessons on
the fundamentals of representative government - including the perennial tension
between executive and legislature.
Notes
1. The primary source is Locke's Second
Treatise of Government, as edited by Peter Laslett, Mentor Books, New York
1965. Bracket numbers refer t o paragraphs of the Second Treatise. Relevant
secondary sources are Julian H. Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of
Sovereignty, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981; W.B. Gwyn, The
Meaning of the Separation of Powers, New Orleans, Tulane University Press,
1965.