

illustrates a more general recovery of Congressional interest in foreign policy, partly in reaction to such low points of influence as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and the secret bombing of Cambodia. Canada has had reason to regret this re-assertion of power in the case of the U.S. Senate's refusal to ratify the East Coast Fisheries and Boundary Treaty.

The same point could be made of other essays in this collection; on Germany, the European Parliament and indeed on the Italian Parliament as described by Mr. Cassese himself. He remarks that "despite many flaws and shortcomings, there is now a drive toward (the Italian) parliament taking a more active role in foreign affairs". While European Parliaments generally do not possess the powers of the U.S. Congress to *control* aspects of foreign policy, neither are they without *influence*. This suggests the difficulty of getting at this matter by concentrating on formal parliamentary powers. Instead, what must be done is to examine parliament's relationship to the political process, history and ideas of a country. One should, in viewing parliaments, pay as close attention to the four-fifths that are below the surface as to the one-fifth that strikes the eye.

Since the fact of parliament's decline in the field of foreign policy is at least unproved by these essays, the explanation of the fact is not called-for. Nonetheless, it should be said that the reason offered by Mr. Cassese (as a "truism") — that the increased pace, complexity and multilateral nature of foreign policy inevitably weaken parliamentary powers — is equally open to question. The rise of international institutions, to take one example, *may* in some cases have strengthened the hand of executives vis-a-vis parliaments in member governments but that it is not inevitably so is again shown by the U.S. Congress. It exercises very considerable influence over American policy in such institutions as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. A recent report by the Canadian Parliamentary

Task Force on North-South Relations recommends that there be greater involvement by national political authorities in the work of these international bureaucracies. This may well entail, in this country as in the United States, greater parliamentary interest and scrutiny.

Robert Miller
Parliamentary Centre for
Foreign Affairs and
Foreign Trade
Ottawa

Report of the Commission to Review Salaries of Members of Parliament and Senators, document tabled in the Senate and House of Commons, December 2, 1980, 85 p. and appendices.

An amendment to the *Senate and House of Commons Act* in 1976, established that salaries for members of both Houses should be reviewed after every federal election. The Report tabled in November 1980 constituted the second enquiry conducted under this Act, the first being the Hales report of 1979.

The report, best known because of the large salary increases it recommended for Members of Parliament,

was also characterized by the fact that it criticized the considerable lag in salaries of the Members of Parliament and ministers as compared to the pay scales for similar responsibilities in the public service, the private sector and other provincial legislatures some of which are much higher than those of the Parliament of Canada.

The Commissioners, Cliff McIsaac and Léon Balcer, felt that the members should receive a significant increase in salary for three main reasons: being a Member of Parliament has become a full-time profession; the work load of a member is much heavier than that of comparable administrative positions; and lastly, low salaries are an obstacle in recruiting candidates who have successful careers outside of politics.

The McIsaac Report took great pains to describe the role of an MP as being the equivalent of a senior management position in the private sector. Indeed, just like his opposite number in the private sector, a Member of Parliament needs a good deal of expertise in management, skills in public relations, aptitude to meet people, a certain power of persuasion, and finally, he has to be able to bear a great deal of stress. An MP also needs to have a sure and rapid judgement regarding the possible solutions to a problem and to be able to obtain the co-operation of people with different backgrounds. Therefore, the report concluded, the technical complexity, the management responsibilities and the impact of an MP's activities are in all respects equivalent to a senior management position in a government department or in the private sector.

While quite plausible, this comparison with the private sector is presented in a very abstract way. There are no figures given to show the number of hours worked by a Member of Parliament, the number of meetings or public appearances, nor the frequency and distance of his travels. Various tables are given showing salary scales for senior managers as well as their recent pay in-



creases. According to those figures, the salary of a Member of Parliament is 25 per cent lower than average in the private sector. It would also appear that increases in Members' salaries are twice as slow. Therefore, the report recommended that the basic salary be raised from \$30,600 to \$45,000 in 1983.

Furthermore, the Commission decided that the Members' expense allowance (\$13,500) be cut in half for the following reasons: the allowance is unpopular, and is also unnecessary for members living in the National Capital Area who do not have to travel as often as those from more remote areas, and do not have to rent a second apartment or a second riding office. The expenses for members from remote areas should be directly paid for by Parliament upon submission of bills.

The report then evaluated the salaries of ministers and other elected officials. It concluded they are often lower than those of provincial ministers. Furthermore, these salaries are a mere pittance when compared with senior management of large corporations. Since the responsibility borne by Ministers is greater than that of their opposite numbers at the provincial level and senior management. The report recommended that ministerial salaries be significantly increased.

Finally, the report recommended that the salary of Senators be raised by approximately half of the increase recommended for members. No justification was given for this difference except that a number of proposals for Senate reform are currently under discussion and until such time as future reforms are clarified it would be difficult for the Commission to recommend significant increases.

Michel Magnant
Political and Social Affairs Division
Research Branch
Library of Parliament

Parliament, Policy and Representation, edited by Harold D. Clarke, Colin Campbell, F.Q. Quo, and Arthur Goddard, Toronto, Methuen, 1980, XXV and 325 PP.

During the two years before the 1979 election there were three major conferences on representation in Canada: one at York University in 1977; one at Victoria in 1978; and one at Simon Fraser early in 1979. The major papers from the York conference were published in a special issue of *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. The proceedings of the Victoria conference were issued by the Institute for Research on Public Policy under the title, *The Legislative Process in Canada: The Need for Reform*. Now we have the product of the Simon Fraser conference.

Not every conference of parliamentarians and professors is successful. Most parliamentarians are far more interested in getting on with the game than in studying its theory and rules, and professors sometimes fail to distinguish between technical research papers — suitable to be pondered and dissected by erudite colleagues — and addresses interesting to the public. From the present volume it is impossible to say whether the Simon Fraser conference was a great success. The editors decided to put together a book based on a selection of papers from the conference and to supplement them with specially commissioned chapters. Which were conference papers is not shown. As the editors state, their intention was to produce a book which would be useful for undergraduates.

In our era, when the political strength — as distinct from the legal authority — of the central government of Canada seems to be declining, the first four papers are enlightening, although not cheering. While Parliament as an institution still has a high place in the public mind, the individual Canadian member is regarded as a poor performer by the public. More and more staff help has been provided for

members; yet the notion that they "soon loose touch" has become more prevalent. Surveys show that few Canadian members — in sharp contrast to U.S. congressmen — attract either attention or trust. In part — see the paper by Anthony Westell — this may be due to the adversarial role now taken on by Canadian newsmen. In part — see the piece by Kornberg and Wolfe — it may be due to the emphasis of the newspapers on the Prime Minister and on elections, an emphasis so strong that in the public mind "the Prime Minister and elections are Parliament."

Members are fully aware of the hostility and irresponsibility of many reporters. This was one reason why the TV cameras were brought into the House of Commons in October, 1977. Unfortunately, over two-thirds of the early reactions to broadcasts were negative: in one poll over 40 per cent of those interviewed said that the proceedings were "long, boring, uninteresting, childish, rude." Price and Clarke, the authors of "Television and the House of Commons," conclude that the bad impression created by what is broadcast is "potentially very serious."

It is notable that higher educated Canadians show a more favourable attitude towards their representatives than does the average citizen. But most students in most Canadian schools and colleges learn very little about the governing of their country, as the Symons Commission on Canadian Studies showed. (In contrast, many American students learn a great deal about American government.) Is it any wonder that viewers who understand almost nothing about Parliament are led by the clips from the Question Period to think of Parliament as a bear-pit?

Two papers — one by Kenneth Kernaghan and one by Audrey Doerr — deal directly with ministerial accountability. Both caution us against changes that would tend to shift the task of governing away from the ministers to