
Advertising in the 1993 Federal Election

by Walter C. Soderlund

*This article looks at the role of political advertising in the strategies of the four political parties which contested the 1993 federal election in English-speaking Canada. Research for this paper was supported by a Social Science and Humanities Council of Canada grant to a team of scholars at Laval University and the University of Windsor who are preparing a major study on political advertising in the 1993 election.**

If mass media provide the stage upon which modern elections increasingly are contested, it is important to note that paid political advertising is but one of many means whereby political messages are transmitted across media channels to prospective voters. "Earned" coverage on national network television news is perhaps the most important way mass media affects the outcome of a campaign. In Canada, "leader tours" across the country are organized to maximize media coverage in the sense that "something" must be perceived to be happening. Speeches are crafted and interesting photo venues are set up to ensure that a leader will get his or her fair share of time. For parties without large campaign budgets, this "free" media coverage is vital to getting their message to voters, and even the most well financed party cannot afford to overlook the advantages of positive news coverage and the obvious perils of its opposite.

Another way in which media transmit political messages during a campaign is through televised leader debates. Not only are the debates themselves watched by a large number of voters, they can develop second lives, as key dramatic encounters in debates are replayed in

news stories and used to partisan advantage in paid party political advertising.

A relatively new development in Canadian elections is the sponsorship of polls by media organizations. Polls, of course, highlight the "horse race" aspects of a campaign, and if one party is doing particularly poorly, or appears to be gaining momentum, this is reported as hard news. In that these polls constitute news that is manufactured and paid for by media outlets, their results are virtually guaranteed to get significant media coverage. There is much uncertainty involved in these types of media coverage, and uncertainty is not a trait highly valued by those who run major national campaigns.

Paid political advertising is advantageous precisely because it gives campaign professionals seemingly complete control over the message that is transmitted: the content of the message, how many times a particular message will be transmitted, to what types of audiences and at what times of the day or night.

Paid political advertising uses mass media as a direct transmission channel from the party to the voter, in that journalists do not have the opportunity to filter, frame or interpret the message.

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This paper argues the seeming advantage of paid political advertising has been to some degree

diminished. In recent elections, political ads themselves have become a topic of media scrutiny and thus commentary on their honesty, taste, and effectiveness, inevitably intrude on how they will be evaluated by viewers.

The Progressive Conservative Party Strategy

Brian Mulroney and the Progressive Conservatives came to power in 1984 based on an unlikely coalition of Quebec nationalism and Western alienation, complemented by traditional Tory support in Ontario and the Atlantic provinces. After nine years of Mulroney leadership, this coalition had unravelled and in 1992, PC fortunes fell to a low point with the party's share of the potential vote ranging between 11 and 22 percent.¹ There were many reasons for this situation and with an election looming on horizon, the Party breathed a collective sigh of relief when, in February 1993, Mr. Mulroney announced his retirement coincident with the choice of a new leader.

The new leader, elected in June 1993, was Kim Campbell, who, became the first female Prime Minister of the country. She presented a new and attractive face to Canadian voters and over the Summer, with fresh leadership in place, the party's fortunes in the polls rebounded to where PC support stood at 32 percent as opposed to the Liberals' 36 percent in August 1993. Especially heartening for the Tories was that Ms Campbell enjoyed a 20 percent lead over Jean Chrétien on leadership attributes.

Progressive Conservative Party strategists interviewed for the study indicated that while they were obviously pleased with Ms Campbell's warm reception, they nevertheless had misgivings. Chief among these was the negative baggage the party carried from the Mulroney years and the almost total reliance upon Ms Campbell, who had little national political experience, to carry the campaign. If she faltered, there was in effect, no fall-back position for the PC's, as their policy positions on issues had not been thought through.

The Tory ad campaign was extensive, both in number of different ads (35 of the 57) run by all four parties, as well as in the amount of money spent on the ad campaign, \$10 million². The first set of thirteen PC ads focused on Kim Campbell and were designed to make her better known to Canadians. Most of these ads were shot using the same background, the same style (Ms Campbell looking off-camera), with the Prime Minister dressed in the same clothes. Each ad would focus on a single issue (leadership, deficit reduction, government inefficiency, unemployment, job creation, need for highly skilled job applicants). Ads in this series ended with the ambiguous tag line "It's Time," which the

Liberals pointed out was subject to more than one interpretation.

The dynamic of the campaign, once it got underway, was not favourable to the Tories. Ms Campbell made two controversial statements in response to press questions. The first occurred on the opening day of the campaign, where she implied that the unemployment problem would be around in Canada to the year 2000. While seemingly this did not hurt the party in the polls, it hardly could be seen as inspiring hope. A second statement to the effect that social reform was too important an issue to deal with during a 47 day election, linked her to the image of arrogance and deviousness associated with Mulroney politics, and began a disastrous slide in Tory support—a 10 percent drop in 7 days.

It was in response to this drop that PC strategists in desperation changed their advertising strategy. Ads build around promoting a positive image of Campbell as a new and dynamic political face were no longer viable. The best chance for Tory growth lay in attacking the Liberals, especially to undermine the leadership capabilities of their leader, Jean Chrétien. In 1988 a series of negative ads aimed at discrediting Liberal leader John Turner halted Liberal momentum following Mr. Turner's strong performance in the Leader Debates.

A series of PC ads, with a new tag line, "Think Twice" attacked the Liberals on both policy issues (the uselessness of make-work projects) and Chrétien's role as a Cabinet Minister in Liberal governments of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980's, wherein he was portrayed as less than brilliant. This series of ads included two which were comprised of a series of unflattering close-up photos focusing on Chrétien's facial paralysis, along with a series of critical voice overs, the most damaging being "I personally would be very embarrassed if he were to become the Prime Minister of Canada."

In spite of focus group testing, these two ads had clearly stepped over the line of perceived fair play in Canadian politics, which historically has been more civil than the American version.

Progressive Conservative candidates and campaign workers had not been briefed on the ads and were ill-prepared to deal with the fire storm of criticism that followed their entry into the campaign fray. Not only were the ads themselves considered cheap shots by those who saw them, including Tory candidates and supporters, almost immediately a media spin was placed

upon them by Stephen Lewis (an NDP commentator on a CBC new program the evening they were first run) that exacerbated the situation for their sponsor. Lewis claimed that the ads attacked Chrétien's disability, not just his competence and looks. Indeed this was the frame the Chrétien campaign, which had been expecting attack ads on their leader from the Tories, placed on them early the next morning, when Mr. Chrétien responded "God gave me a physical defect and I've accepted that since I was a kid".³

According to Campbell's Chief of Staff, all of this happened without Ms Campbell having seen the ads. There was fierce pulling and tugging between those who directed the campaign, who were responsible for the ads, believed they were working and wanted to keep running them, and the leader and her circle of advisors, who wanted them taken off the air immediately. The ads ran on Thursday evening, October 14; by late Friday afternoon, Campbell ordered them pulled. Interestingly, PC attack ads on Chrétien continued, but these ads tied negative commentary to his policies and perceived weaknesses in leadership rather than to his appearance. As well, a new series of ads featured Ms Campbell explaining her stand on the issues of job creation, science and technology, small business and health care. These ads ended with the tag line, "Elect a Kim Campbell Government."

The outcome, however, was that the ads, which were seen to have unfairly attacked Mr. Chrétien, did irreparable damage. Progressive Conservative electoral support plummeted following the ad fiasco, and on election day the Party received only 16 percent of the vote and managed to salvage but two seats from the 169 they had won in 1988—an electoral debacle unmatched in Canadian political history. What the outcome would have been without the self-destructive political ads is open to speculation, as the momentum of the campaign had already shifted to the Liberals before the Tory's desperation bid to turn the numbers around. However, a respected member of the PC Strategy Committee estimated that without the ads the party could have won 50 to 60 seats, while an NDP strategist calculated the PCs could have claimed 25 seats. Whatever the actual number, the decision to run these two ads has to rank as the single greatest blunder in the use of advertising in Canadian elections.

The Liberal Party

In 1993, the Liberal Party had been out of power for nine years. Prior to this interlude, they had been the dominant political party in Canada during the twentieth century,

with Pierre Elliot Trudeau holding the Prime Minister's job for almost all the period 1968 to 1983.

Following electoral defeats to a Mulroney-led progressive Conservative Party in 1984 and 1988, the Liberals changed leader in 1990. In a hard fought leadership campaign, Jean Chrétien, thirty-year veteran of Liberal Party politics, emerged the victor. Dubbed "Yesterday's Man," his performance as Leader of the Opposition in the last years of the Mulroney government had been disappointing, and, while as of "...January 1993, Chrétien was still not taken seriously,...his party was nevertheless poised to win office".

The Liberal's high standing in the polls clearly had more to do with voter disaffection with Mulroney than with perceived Liberal strengths, especially the leadership attributes of Mr. Chrétien. Thus, although poll data had looked good for the Liberals for 18 months prior to the election, when the election was called in August, the party was nervous about Ms Campbell's lead in personal popularity over Mr. Chrétien. Liberal strategists interviewed certainly did not perceive the election to be "in the bag" and there was a good deal of apprehension regarding how the campaign would unfold.

Liberal success can be attributed to extensive and effective organization, fund-raising, fence-mending and policy clarification in the two year period prior to the election, capped by a disciplined campaign strategy that was built around clearly articulated policies, with Chrétien portrayed in advertising as a seasoned and sincere team leader.

The Liberal ad campaign, which features eleven different ads at a cost estimated at close to 10 million, was focused on two goals: (1) to reintroduce Chrétien to younger Canadians (18 to 30) and demonstrate his leadership qualities and (2) to make job creation the major issue on which the election turned. The campaign succeeded on both counts. Most ads featured Mr. Chrétien in a relaxed setting, talking informally and sincerely about problems of unemployment and job creation. For example, "Enough is enough. The Liberal Party has the plan to create jobs and can give back dignity to the unemployed," followed by the tag line, "I have the people, I have the plan. We will make a difference," which ended almost all Liberal ads. A particularly hard-hitting ad showed storefront bankruptcies on main streets of Canadian cities with the following voice over: "Over the last five years, the restrictive economic policy of the Mulroney/Campbell Conservatives have caused over 300,000 bankruptcies and put 1.6 million Canadians out of work. On October 25, maybe its time you put them out of work."

Consistency of focus was the key to Liberal advertising success. There was some debate among strategists on

whether to take on the Reform Party in negative ads and a series of negative ads featuring Mulroney and Campbell embracing had been made and were ready to use if the PC's used negative ads early in the campaign, but these options were not pursued. The Liberals did make one counter-attack ad as a response to a Tory ad showing "Loonies" being dumped from a wheelbarrow into a hole in the ground, while voice overs ridiculed the Liberal job creation plan. The Liberal ad, showing a series of working people, began, "These are some of the people who have built this country—built our roads, built our bridges, built our home" and ended with a sharp-edged comment: "Kim Campbell says these are not jobs for the 90s. What's she built? The Liberal ad focused on PC arrogance in demeaning manual labour, while legitimizing their own job creation plan. It was run for only two days, and was consistent with a philosophy that ads needed to be immediately reactive to the campaign situation. As well, the Liberals ran one ad made especially for British Columbia, where Chrétien appealed to the people of that province for their help. It replaced national ads in B.C. for the last four or five days of the campaign.

The Liberal campaign came together and held together. The campaign organization was in a state of high readiness; a comprehensive campaign platform in the form of the "Red Book," provided Canadians with a sense of comfort regarding what the Liberals were committed to do; ad strategists read the mood of the Canadian people correctly and stayed away from negative ads; Mr. Chrétien regained his political touch and performed well in the Debates; mistakes were kept to a minimum and when they did occur they were dealt with promptly; and strategists accurately assessed the problems in the PC campaign and held to their strategy while the Tories self-destructed.

Overall, the Liberal ad campaign was given high marks by political opponents.

The New Democratic Party

The 1988 election had been a major breakthrough for the NDP in terms of seats won and the 1993 election should have seen the consolidation of this success. Instead, the NDP ended up with 7 percent of the vote (its lowest total since its founding in 1962) and only 9 seats, not enough for it to maintain official party status. While some attributed the fall in NDP fortunes to a decline in support for parties on the left generally, others thought the

causes for its poor performance, while varied, were nevertheless specific to Canadian politics.

Paradoxically, while the 1988 election had seen a peak in NDP electoral success, the campaign was internally divisive, as the labour wing (centred in Ontario) felt that the party had not taken the lead in opposition to the Free Trade Agreement, allowing John Turner and Liberals to emerge as the champions of Canadian nationalism. These divisions continued past the election, leading to a leadership change and a continuing focus on free trade in the 1993 election. The change in leadership in 1990 from Ed Broadbent to Audrey McLaughlin also contributed to the NDP's decline. McLaughlin, at the time of her victory the first female leader of a major Canadian political party, was only partly to blame. Whatever a Canadian's political affiliation may be, it is acknowledged that over the years the NDP (and its predecessor the CCF) has produced a series of extraordinarily talented, competent and respected leaders: J.S. Woodsworth, J.J. Coldwell, Tommy Douglas, David Lewis and Ed Broadbent. Expectation for an NDP leader were high, and Ms McLaughlin, a first term MP from the Yukon without too much political experience, was at a severe disadvantage in having her performance compared to the above list of leaders. Whether gender played a negative role in voter evaluation of her leadership qualities is open to question, but whatever the cause, her image remained fuzzy and by January 1993, ...she had slipped to an overall negative rating—41 percent negative vs. 38 percent positive.

Just prior to the start of the campaign, a video focused on Ms McLaughlin was discovered to have been edited in the United States—close to a mortal sin for a party championing Canadian nationalism.

The NDP (as is the case with most political parties) had internal factions. In the case of the NDP, however, it appears that the leader was unable to consolidate control over the party bureaucracy: there were continuing disputes over personnel, policy positions and strategy that resulted in staff demoralization and turnover in the crucial year prior to the election. Clearly the party organization was at war with itself and a coherent campaign strategy, such as that crafted by the Liberals, had not emerged as the election approached. Poor judgment by party staff did not help matters.

As a result of press criticism, the incident forced the resignation of the Communications Director just three weeks before the beginning of the campaign.

Another important factor contributing to federal NDP problems (largely outside the control of the party) was the performance of three NDP provincial governments (Ontario, Saskatchewan and British Columbia) which had been elected in 1990 and 1991. At the time these elections were seen as manifestations of growing NDP support, but the recession which had hit the economy forced these governments into austerity measures which made them appear little different from the more conservative governments they had replaced. The Ontario government, in particular, attempted to save money by freezing or rolling back wages of public servants in the form of a "Social Contract," which the public sector unions saw as an attack on collective bargaining and a betrayal on the part of the NDP government they had helped elect. While the federal and provincial NDP parties are separate entities (but less autonomous than either the Liberals or Progressive Conservatives), the federal party never fully clarified its position on Social Contract type wage savings, and suffered financially, organizationally and electorally by a withdrawal of union support.

Also problematic for the NDP, with a historical self-image as a left of centre protest party, was its growing identification as an establishment party. In part this resulted from NDP electoral successes at the provincial level, in part from the NDP's decision to join with the PC's and Liberals in supporting the Charlottetown Accord and in part from Reform Party Leader Preston Manning's effective grouping of the NDP with the Liberals and Tories as "old-line" parties during the Leaders Debate. In fact the NDP, due to age, electoral success and policies was no longer seen as a vehicle for protest. As one NDP strategist commented, "It's hard to be a protest party when you're governing half the country".

One further factor worked against the NDP in the 1993 election. Voters were clearly fed up with Mr. Mulroney, but the Liberals, not the NDP were seen as the party capable of winning a majority of seats and dislodging the hated Tories. Thus the phenomenon of "strategic voting," i.e., voting for Liberals to ensure the defeat of the Progressive Conservatives, played a part in the mix of factors that found the NDP in single digits in the polls at the time the election was called.

As the campaign got underway, NDP strategy was to hold their core vote of 18 to 20 percent and maintain their 43 seats. The Liberals were seen as the main opponent, and the NDP (as was the case with virtually all the parties), underestimated Reform strength. It was low poll

numbers that resulted in what was termed the "NDP death watch" emerging as the major frame through which the media filtered NDP campaign stories. The initial set of four NDP ads out of a total of nine run during the campaign at a cost of \$7.4 million, were referred to collectively "Angry Voices." They were shot in black and white and featured a variety of enraged Canadians yelling about various problems and government misdeeds, chiefly in the areas of health care, free trade and unemployment, patronage, government spending and tax inequities. They were designed to get the NDP noticed and taken seriously. These ads ended with the tag line, "Ottawa hasn't got the message—Send it. Vote NDP." Within a week of the "Angry Voices" ads going on the air, polling data from British Columbia showed that they were pushing voters to the Reform Party. This assessment was confirmed by the Reform Campaign Director who looked at them and "thought they were running our ads".

This set of ads was replaced by two ads focused on health care. Again, both were shot in black and white, with one showing an overly made up McLaughlin explaining the advantages of Canadian health care system over the American and another showing a family forced to move from their home due to medical expenses. These ads were intended to play on fears of what the Liberals might do to health policy—"The Liberals let you down on Free Trade. Will they let you down on health care? Vote NDP."

Ms McLaughlin held her own in the Leaders Debates, however, with five party leaders participating, it was difficult for anyone to make the kind of impression on voters necessary to turn the campaign around. In fact, NDP numbers never got above 10 percent at any point in the campaign, and in week five, the NDP took the extraordinary step of declaring the Liberals a winner, and appealing to their supporters to abandon strategic voting and come home. Two ads featured rolling scripts with a male voice over: "The Liberals are on their way to a majority government. It's time you think about the choice you'll make next Monday. You can choose to elect another Liberal backbencher, or you can choose to elect a New Democrat who will pressure the Liberals to keep their promises—promises to create jobs, to protect medicare and social programs. On Monday, there's one way to make sure the Liberals keep their promises. On Monday, you can choose a New Democrat."

At this point, the NDP had hoped to salvage 12 seats, the minimum needed to maintain official party status and the perks that went with it. In spite of the advertising and the concentration of effort in a few ridings, on election day the NDP missed its final target by three seats.

The Reform Party

As an almost brand new political party, Reform went into the election with a good deal of optimism. This optimism existed despite standing at about 10 percent in the polls when the election was called. The party actually won 52 seats with 19 percent of the vote, but their goal of becoming the Official Opposition just eluded their grasp, as the Bloc Québécois won 54 seats with just 14 percent of the vote.

This extraordinary political achievement can be attributed to two factors: the development of a grass roots organizational structure prior to the campaign and a campaign built around the solid leadership of Preston Manning and focused on three issues: democratic reforms (bringing people into politics); fiscal responsibility (debt reduction and elimination of the deficit in three years, and constitutional reform (no Distinct Society for Quebec and equality of the provinces). Although not pursued as vigorously in the campaign, Reform was known for wanting a reduction in immigration levels and tougher anti-crime measures.

Having begun as a Western protest party in 1987, in 1991 the Reform Party took a bold step in expanding east of Manitoba—i.e., into Ontario, the province with the lion's share of seats in Parliament. In the 1993 election, the Liberals won 98 of Ontario seats and Reform the remaining one. Critical, however, in judging the impact of Reform in Ontario is the fact that the party finished in second place in 57 ridings.

All the more interesting is that this spectacular electoral success was achieved virtually without television advertising.

The Reform Party made three ads, focused on democratic reform and fiscal responsibility and ending with the tag line, "Reform—now you have a choice." The party, however, with a budget of \$1.5 million, had little money to make media buys and had little free time advertising.

Reform strategists reported, that even if the party had the funds, they would not have undertaken major TV advertising. Following the Charlottetown Accord Referendum, where the "yes" side had engaged in an unsuccessful slick advertising campaign, Reform strategists concluded that political advertising was not connecting with the voting audience. Thus, in the 1993 campaign Reform relied on earned media coverage, "substance-rich" broadsheets (giving the party's position on various issues such as the deficit and criminal

justice), plus a very limited amount of advertising. All of this was designed to feed into word of mouth advertising. During the campaign, "over 19 million pieces of literature were delivered by local volunteers".

Clearly, the Reform Party benefited from voter disaffection with the Progressive Conservatives, and Reform saw their major bloc of votes coming from the Tories. As the campaign progressed, it became apparent that NDP voters as well, especially in Ontario and British Columbia, were responding to the Reform message. Thus, a strange amalgamation of protest voters plus true Reform ideologues came together to propel the party into national prominence. Whether this somewhat curious combination of electoral support can be maintained over time and whether Reform can consolidate a substantial core of voters (i.e., replace the Progressive Conservatives as the major party on the right of the political spectrum), is an open question. Whatever the case, Reform strategists claim that conventional TV advertising will not be a major campaign weapon of the party in the next election. It will stick instead to disseminating information through print media.

Conclusion

At first glance the performance of political advertising in the 1993 Canadian election does not speak well to its efficacy in turning the minds of voters. Not only did the party that spent the most on advertising, the Progressive Conservatives, come out of the election worse than decimated, strong evidence exists that their own advertising (the attack ads against Jean Chrétien) was to a considerable extent responsible for the extent of the debacle. For the New Democratic Party the judgment on the impact of their advertising is not as harsh, nevertheless, there is some evidence that their first series of ads served to benefit one of their opponents more than themselves. As well, it must be pointed out that no campaign tactic, advertising included, moved the party up in the estimation of voters.

The only bright spot for advertising in the 1993 election is found with the victorious Liberal Party. They relied quite extensively on advertising, and while it is difficult to separate its impact from that of other aspects of the campaign, Liberal advertising was evaluated positively by political opponents in the PC, NDP and Reform parties, and it no doubt made a significant contribution to the party's victory.

How can we account for the dramatic discrepancies in the performance of political advertising among the different parties contesting the election? We suggest three possible explanations. First, perhaps advertising has outlived its usefulness and we will see a return to the

use of less sophisticated, more grass-roots techniques to win voter support. This is certainly the conclusion of those who guide the electoral strategies of the Reform Party. Second, advertising is not a miracle cure for parties that have either managed to alienate voters or have failed to inspire voter confidence. The Progressive Conservative Party had been in power for nine years, and in that time, for a number of reasons, lost the support of the coalition that it depended on for votes. There seemed a chance that Kim Campbell could make the voters forget about Brian Mulroney, but this did not happen. The NDP, the second major loser in the advertising wars, also entered the campaign without its traditional core of voter support. To believe that advertising could somehow magically make up for these serious deficiencies is probably beyond reasonable expectations. Third, effective campaign advertising is an art form. Progressive Conservative and NDP ads in the 1993 elections were just not very good. The PC ad attacking Jean Chrétien, for example, violated one of the most basic rules of negative advertising: do not go after the personal characteristics of the opponent—concentrate on policy stances. In this case the violation of norms of ethical behaviour was so egregious, that the party itself lost credibility—predictable by another basic rule of negative advertising, there is a possibility of a “boomerang” effect visited upon those who launch negative ads.

Voter mood will continue to change and must be accurately assessed for each election, but voter sophistication now appears to be a constant. One cannot expect ads that lie to people will be successful.

NDP failures are more subtle, nevertheless, they are evident as well. Chief among these appear to be misreading of both the mood of the Canadian people (they were already angry and didn't need to be stirred up further) and the uncertain direction which negative advertising might drive the voter in a multi-party race. In the case of the “angry voices” ads, Reform, not the NDP, proved to be the party that attracted the protest vote. NDP ads, as they focused on Liberal and Tory

policies and behaviour, clearly missed the threat which the Reform party posed for the party. As well, the issues discussed in NDP ads did not coincide with the concerns of the electorate. Free trade and threats to health care, however important these were in their own right, were not issues of salience in the 1993 election, yet these were the ones focused upon in NDP ads.

In spite its rather dismal performance in the 1993 Canadian election, this hardly signals the end of advertising in Canadian political campaigns. What it does signal is that both the mood and sophistication of the Canadian voter had changed in 1993.

Also, the political landscape in Canada was very different in 1993 from what it had been in the thirty years prior to the election. The presence of two new parties (Reform and the Bloc Québécois) in the political spectrum, fundamentally changed the dynamics of the campaign. There was a good deal of denial on the part of the old line parties regarding the impact of these newcomers, and their initial ad campaigns were quite frankly constructed as if they did not exist. The lines of conflict in 1993 were seen to be identical to those of 1988, in that the ads of the three major parties all targeted each other. The Liberals were able to get away with this serious miscalculation—the PC's and the NDP did not fare as well.

If expectations for their performance are not wildly exaggerated and ads themselves are carefully crafted to fit the realities of the campaign, there is no reason why advertising cannot reestablish itself as an important and useful technique in attracting voter support in future Canadian elections. ♦

Notes

- * Thanks go to Livianna Tossutti, Walt Romanow and Alex Gill who assisted the author in conducting the research upon which this article is based. Needless to say the study could not have been done without the cooperation of fifteen party strategists who shared their views on campaign advertising.
- 1. Background information on the campaign comes from A. Frizzell, J. Pammett and A. Westell, *The Canadian General Election of 1993*. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994.
- 2. “Ads don't buy votes”, *The Globe and Mail* (April 30, 1994): D6.
- 3. K. Whyte, “The face that sank a thousand Tories”, *Saturday Night* (February 1994): 14-18; 58-60.